

ward account does. However, it is not easy to combine the idea of intellectualism with the causal effect of nonrational desires and the possible problem for Brickhouse and Smith lies in their explanation of Socrates' conception of virtue as a kind of knowledge.

*Susanna Aro*

FRANCESCO PELOSI: *Plato on Music, Soul and Body*. Translated by SOPHIE HENDERSON. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge – New York 2010. ISBN 978-0-521-76045-4. VII, 228 pp. GBP 50, USD 85.

Sophie Henderson has skilfully translated into English Francesco Pelosi's monograph about music, soul and body in Plato. The translation is much needed because there are not many extensive philosophical studies on this topic available in English, and yet the topic is central in Plato's philosophy.

In the Introduction, Pelosi claims to be showing that a study of Plato's discussion on music helps us better understand his view of the relationship between soul and body. He contends that even if there are good grounds, especially in the *Phaedo*, for taking Plato as a proponent of a dualist theory, this issue is by no means settled. Even the *Phaedo*, the author argues, "presents ideas for a different vision of the mind-body problem". He continues: "But other dialogues offer many more numerous and consistent reasons to keep open the case for considering the mind-body question in Plato" (p. 5).

This general aim notwithstanding, there is not much in the book that directly addresses the issue about dualism between the soul and the body. However, this is not a major shortcoming, because the merits of the book lie elsewhere, in particular in the admirably detailed discussion of the many special issues in music. They constitute the body of the four main thematic chapters.

The principal sources include the *Phaedo*, *Republic* 2, 3, and 7, *Laws* 2 and 7, and the *Timaeus*. In addition to these, the author uses other sources, including ancient commentaries, to clarify, elaborate and contrast his arguments. He approaches the texts from an emphatically unitarian point of view, assuming that Plato's considerations in different dialogues and contexts are basically consistent. This is well grounded in most cases, but I would nevertheless have expected a more careful contextualization of the passages discussed.

The first chapter discusses musical *paideia* in early childhood, with special focus on *ēthos* and *mīmēsis*. In opposition to a "formalist" view of music, represented by the Epicurean Philodemus of Gadara, for example, Pelosi argues that for Plato and many other ancient theorists, "music can express emotional and ethical states capable of substantially altering the human *psychē* and its emotive and cognitive faculties" (p. 31). In this respect, Plato's discussion of *harmoniai* and rhythms are of the greatest interest. As is well known, Plato takes the Dorian and Phrygian *harmoniai* to express two key ethical qualities: courage and temperance (*Resp.* 399a3–c6), and Pelosi puts special effort into clarifying this connection.

While the first chapter concentrates on the sensitive parts of the soul, the second chapter explores music as a therapy for the rational soul. Pelosi uses as his key evidence here *Timaeus* 47c–e, which fits this purpose very well. One of his major arguments is that musical therapy is based on "the *contact* between substances that are akin (*syngeneis*)" (p. 75; Pelosi's italics). The

idea is that the movements involved in musical harmony are analogous with the circular movements of the soul, and that the two come into contact. Pelosi goes on to argue, not implausibly, that the process described in *Tim.* 47c–e is compatible with the one implied in *Resp.* 401d–402a. Thus understood, the *euschēmosynē* produced by music at *Resp.* 401d8 is comparable to the *katakosmēsis* referred to in *Tim.* 47d6.

The third chapter turns to Plato's treatment of harmonic science in *Resp.* 7. First, Pelosi discusses in which way music serves as a discipline preparatory to dialectic, and he then explores how Plato's understanding of harmonic science differs from both empirical and Pythagorean views. In the course of the discussion, he makes many illuminating observations. He points out, for example, that Plato displays a rather different attitude towards the empiricists and the Pythagoreans: derision regarding the former, and respect in reference to the latter (p. 141).

The fourth and final chapter examines two specific issues: acoustic phenomena and perception, and secondly, the soul and the various theories of harmony. Again, Pelosi's discussion is very detailed and packed with references to parallel passages in the Platonic corpus and even in other relevant sources.

In sum, this book is a significant contribution to the study of Plato's views on music. The book assumes some familiarity with Plato and ancient theories of music. For this reason it is not easy reading for a beginner in classics, musicology or philosophy, but a more advanced reader will enjoy its high-level discussion.

Mika Perälä

DANIEL S. WERNER: *Myth and Philosophy in Plato's Phaedrus*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge – New York 2012. ISBN 978-1-107-02128-0. 302 pp. GBP 65, USD 99.

Myths are a common target of criticism in the dialogues of Plato, and yet myths are frequently used, even created by Plato himself, as vehicles of his philosophical expression. This paradox is the subject of D. S. Werner's (= W) book in which he thoroughly discusses the myths and their function in the *Phaedrus* and Plato's motives in integrating them in his dialogue style.

In the introductory chapter, W. illustrates the historical and cultural context of Greek myths in general, and the relation of Platonic myths to this wider context. In the difficult task of defining a myth, W. emphasizes the basic inherent elements of myth such as traditionalism, anonymity and variation. The status of myth, W. argues, changed along with the rise of written culture and development of the natural sciences, history and philosophy in the sixth century B.C.: myths in written form are not as flexible as those transmitted orally, and as they were no longer the sole possession of bards, they subsequently became the object of scrutiny and criticism. This does not, as W. emphasizes, mean that myths became any less important or that there was a change in Greek mentality from *μῦθος* to *λόγος*, these terms remaining interchangeable. Instead, W. suggests, we should see Plato's use of myth (both the term and its substance) as an interplay with *logos* and a conscious reflection of "the cultural and linguistic heritage" of these concepts (p. 6): W. aligns with the view that the interplay between myth and *logos* is not so much about *rationality* as *authority*. Different versions of myths competed for